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Amartya Sen‟s readers were expecting the second volume of a series of two devoted to 
rationality, freedom and justice. Indeed, it is the program announced by Sen (2002) in the 
preface of Rationality and Freedom. The first volume was more particularly addressed to 
economists, tackling social choice theory conceptual issues. We could find in it Sen‟s 
contributions to normative economics since the middle of the 1980‟s, most of them already 
published in famous reviews of this field. So the expectation was a book entitled Freedom 
and Justice, completing this inventory on the philosophical side of his work and disclosing his 
immense debt toward John Rawls.   
Surprisingly The Idea of Justice is not exactly the book announced seven years 
earlier
2
. Whereas the aggregation of articles in the first volume did not offer a clear global 
representation of what was at stake in Sen‟s work, the second is more likely to propose a 
unified view of Sen‟s aim and perspective. Beyond the technical and specific issues discussed 
by Sen in various domains, he seems to define here the intellectual operation he‟s been 
pursuing for nearly half a century now either in normative economics, in development 
economics, or in moral philosophy. He advocates a comparative approach of justice that is a 
radical departure from a theory of justice in its accepted meaning. It is thus a radical departure 
from John Rawls‟ theory of justice.  
Straight from the introduction, Sen‟s ambition is spelled out: his approach competes 
against Rawls‟ theory of justice as equity (1971). This is quite a striking statement: he does 
not propose a complementary approach to Rawls‟ one as is generally understood from Sen‟s 
own and well-known presentation of his capability approach (1980, pp. 218-219, underlined 
by us): 
                                                 
1 M. Gilardone  
CREM, Université de Caen, Caen, France 
e-mail: muriel.gilardone@unicaen.fr 
2
 In fact it seems that Sen followed what Rawls advised him, that is to write a veritable book to clarify what 
would be a theory of justice for him, instead of a mere collection of articles. That is why it took him several 
years. Nevertheless, Freedom and Justice announced in 2002 will probably be published later. 
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The focus on basic capabilities can be seen as a natural extension of Rawls’s concern 
with primary goods, shifting attention from goods to what goods do to human beings. 
[…] There are, of course, many difficulties with the notion of “basic capability 
equality.” In particular, the problem of indexing the basic capability bundles is a serious 
one. It is, in many ways, a problem comparable with the indexing of primary good 
bundles in the context of Rawlsian equality. […] Indeed, basic capability equality can 
be seen as essentially an extension of the Rawlsian approach in a non-fetishist 
direction. 
However, there was a difficulty to understand why Sen deliberately left his approach 
incomplete, and thus never proposed a real replacement for Rawls‟ theory of justice as many 
commentators expected. A new theory of justice would suppose aggregative or prescriptive 
principles, which Sen has always refused to specify. In contrast, Martha Nussbaum has 
developed what could be seen as an alternative theory of justice in terms of capabilities, 
defining a universal list of capabilities, and it has become current to interpret their differences 
with regard to their respective specialty domains. Nussbaum‟s capability approach finds its 
roots in Aristotelian philosophy and the research of what a “good life” is, whereas Sen‟s work 
is rooted in normative economics, and more precisely in social choice theory. It was 
considered as the explanation of his focus on the right procedure to draw up a list of 
capabilities, rather than on the list itself. Sen‟s ambition was above all supposed to be an 
attempt to make evolve orthodox economic theory in redefining its concepts, broadening its 
methods and shifting its object from utility to capability, in no case as an attempt to replace 
Rawls‟ theory of justice as equity. 
The Idea of justice comes to offer a new perspective and a very different interpretation 
of Sen‟s enterprise. His aim is not only to break the deadlock in which economists are since 
Arrow‟s monograph (1951). Sen clarifies here that he also speaks to philosophers. His 
approach intends to renew normative economics, but political philosophy as well, proposing 
another way than the Rawlsian way to apprehend justice
3
. Calling economic orthodoxy into 
question is not enough; Sen envisages calling philosophical orthodoxy into question too.  
In this review essay, we will focus on four salient points of the book: 
1. The partition of the different approaches of justice in two traditions 
2. The concept of “positional objectivity” to serve impartiality 
3. The will to reconcile reason and sentiments 
4. The capability approach as important but not exclusive 
And we will conclude by some remarks on the link between Sen‟s idea of justice and 
his conception of social choice theory, and by some regrets on missing references. 
1. The partition of the different approaches of justice in two traditions 
                                                 
3
 We notice that Sen still hesitates to clearly call his approach a “theory of justice” and present in the book a 
“particular understanding of the theory of justice” (p. 5). Unsurprisingly, he chose to title the book The Idea of 
Justice, confirming his refusal to identify his proposition with a conventional theory of justice: complete, 
prescriptive and directly applicable. For Sen, the requirements of a theory of justice are precisely to bring reason 
into play in the diagnosis of justice and injustice, and reason differs accordingly to circumstances, places and 
people involved. 
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His introduction is unequivocal: Rawls belongs to a tradition Sen calls “transcendental 
institutionalism” (as well as R. Dworkin, R. Nozick, D. Gautier); Sen belongs to a tradition of 
“realization-focused comparative approaches”. Both traditions have emerged in the 
Enlightenment period, but radically differ in their way of reasoning and in their object of 
reasoning. The first one was led by Hobbes and particularly developed by Locke, Rousseau 
and Kant; the other was pursued in various ways by Smith, Condorcet, Wollstonecraft, 
Bentham, Marx and Mill, among others. The first examines the nature of “the just” in order to 
find the perfect institutions; the other compares different social realizations and tries to find 
some criteria for an alternative being „less unjust‟ than another. The first one is pure 
abstraction; the other is grounded on experience and observation. While comparative 
approaches to which Sen refers to are considerably more modest, they are thought as more 
efficient to reduce injustice. 
The distinction between the two approaches is, for Sen, very deep. He identifies two 
problematic aspects of transcendentalism: feasibility and redundancy (p. 9). This means that it 
is neither possible (feasibility aspect), nor desirable (redundancy aspect
4
) to reach a 
reasonable agreement on the nature of a “just society”. It is more relevant to choose among 
the feasible alternatives, on the basis of practical reason. Moreover institutionalism is also 
problematic; arrangement-focused view of justice is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure 
justice
5
. What is important is the impact of arrangements on individual behaviors and 
capabilities, on the lives people can lead. His proposition is thus a radical departure from the 
Rawlsian formulation of the theory of justice. 
What is needed for the comparative approach as Sen promotes is a comprehensive 
search for social agreements, based on public reasoning constantly renewed, on rankings of 
alternatives that can be realized. This way of thinking is at the heart of social choice theory 
which Sen traces back to Condorcet, while the formal discipline has emerged with Arrow 
(1951). Social choice theory is certainly “an active field of investigation, exploring ways and 
means of basing comparative assessments of social alternatives on the values and priorities of 
the people involved” (p. 17), but its results and methods are hardly accessible to non-
specialists. However the underlying reasoning is very close to the one of political 
philosophers who develop a comparative approach for justice. Sen does not disavow his 
background in social choice theory and acknowledges that his experience in that field has 
played a critical part in his way of considering social decisions. However he reasserts an 
ethics of democracy that goes far beyond a mere possibility for vote and refers to J. S. Mill‟s 
idea of “a government by discussion” – according to which democracy‟s success depends of 
the extent to which people‟s voices can be heard.  
2. The concept of “positional objectivity” to serve impartiality 
This ethics of democracy is crucial in Sen‟s understanding of scientific attitude and 
evaluator‟s “impartiality”. It is important to notice that he prefers the expression 
                                                 
4
 Redundancy refers for Sen to the idea of usefulness or waste of time of “an identification of a possibly 
unavailable perfect situation that could not be transcended” (p. 9).  
5
 The importance of institutions is not denied by Sen, but their role is only instrumental: (1) they can directly 
contribute to develop people‟s capability to do and to be according to what they have reasons to value; (2) they 
can facilitate our capacity to examine values and priorities in creating opportunities for public debate. 
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“transpositional objectivity”6 to “impartiality”, which refers to a “reasoned scrutiny from 
different perspectives” (p. 45). On this respect, there are two major disagreements with 
Rawls. First, Sen refuses the Rawlsian idea of “veil of ignorance” aiming to allow individual 
judgements regardless of individual position. Second, Sen is skeptical towards the assumption 
that there will be a unanimous choice of a unique set of „two principles of justice‟ in a 
hypothetical situation of primordial equality. These sticking points are linked to the 
“feasibility critic”. Nevertheless, Sen (p. 42) admits that “The reasoning that is sought in 
analysing the requirements of justice will incorporate some basic demands of impartiality, 
which are integral parts of the idea of justice and injustice. At this point there is some merit in 
summoning the ideas of John Rawls and his analysis of moral and political objectivity”. 
Thus, he draws inspiration from Rawls on one point – one among the five proposed by 
Rawls (1996, pp. 146-148)  – : “a conception of objectivity must establish a public framework 
of thought sufficient for the concept of judgement to apply and for conclusions to be reached 
on the basis of reasons and evidence after discussion and due reflection.” This point cannot 
but strengthen Sen‟s idea since the 1960‟s according to which value judgments not only can 
be discussed, but can evolve through discussion. Sen (Ibid.) adds another important quotation 
of Rawls: “To say that a political conviction is objective is to say that there are reasons, 
specified by a reasonable and mutually recognizable political conception (satisfying those 
essentials), sufficient to convince all reasonable persons that it is reasonable.” 
However, Sen does not define what “reasonable” means for the philosopher. It would 
have been interesting to remind that “reasonable persons”, for Rawls (1996, p. 49), “are not 
moved by the general good as such [altruism] but desire for its own sake a social world in 
which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist 
that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others.” The 
reasonable is consequently “public” – as opposed to “private” – in the sense that “we enter on 
an equal footing the public world of others and […] we think we are ready to offer or to 
accept […] equitable terms of collaboration with them” (Ibid., p. 53). Actually Sen (p. 43) 
considers “all of us are capable of being reasonable through being openminded about 
welcoming information and through reflecting on arguments coming from different quarters, 
along with undertaking interactive deliberations and debates on how the underlying issues 
should be seen”. It is not necessary for him to insist on this category of “reasonable persons” 
which leads to exclude straightaway those who would not be. Rather, he prefers envisaging 
objectivity, and therefore what would emanate from reasonable persons for Rawls, as what 
tends to survive opened and informed public debate. 
In fact Sen shares with Jürgen Habermas the idea of a procedural approach, but since it 
imposes also a lot of precise requirements as for public deliberation, he thinks that it does not 
differ from the strategy of reasoning offered by Rawls – ignoring thus all debates which have 
opposed these two authors. It is also quite surprising to read (p. 42) that in this work Sen 
draws “both on Putnam‟s and Rawls‟s analyses, but do not explore further the specific issues 
on which their differences rest”. This difference concerns the recourse to universal principles, 
which the pragmatist tradition rejects while Rawls does not hesitate to use it while linking 
them to an inquiry into the peculiarities of every particular ethical problem. In this respect, 
Sen is closer to Putnam than to Rawls given his determination since the end of the 1960s to 
                                                 
6
 The notion of « transpositonal objectivity » appeared in his writings in the early 1990‟s. 
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show that alleged universal principles, whether in normative economics or in moral 
philosophy, can very well not receive a general approbation in all contexts. And the distance 
with Rawls is all the more firm that Sen (pp. 44-45) associates him to a notion of “closed 
impartiality”, contrasting with another called “opened impartiality” associated to Smith way 
of thinking: “While Rawls‟s primary focus seems to be on variations of personal interests and 
personal priorities, Adam Smith was also concerned with the need to broaden the discussion 
to avoid local parochialism of values, which might have the effect of ignoring some pertinent 
arguments, unfamiliar in a particular culture.” 
What Sen holds from all these authors is the necessity of a reasoned scrutiny from 
different perspectives to give an objective character in ethical and political convictions. He 
considers nevertheless that the principles which survive such scrutiny cannot be a unique set. 
In other words, Sen admits the simultaneous co-survival of rival principles. 
This reflection on the notion of impartiality allows Sen to dwell on a conception of 
objectivity which underlies his whole work and which is very different from the classical 
conception which he qualifies as “positional independence” (p. 157). He considers indeed that 
“the reality of position dependence of observations may have to be taken into account in 
explaining the difficulty of achieving a positionally unbiased comprehension » (P. 161). Here 
he opposes to Thomas Nagel (1986) who defines objectivity as “a view from nowhere” that is 
not resting on the characters and the specific individual positions in the world. For Sen, the 
notion of “positional objectivity” is more useful and realistic for the ethical and political 
questions. It allows in particular bringing to light a triple entanglement which we inevitably 
have to deal with in any evaluation and which must be distinguished from subjectivity: the 
entanglement of facts, conventions and values underlined by Putnam (2002). To recognize it 
is a first step towards objective understanding and communication within the framework of 
deliberation. The language of justice itself leans on conventions which it is advisable to make 
explicit, in particular if one wants to discuss new ideas that do not correspond to the usual 
proposals. In Sen‟s opinion (p. 160), “there would therefore be something of a lacuna in 
thinking of ethical objectivity only in terms of „the view from nowhere‟, rather than „from a 
delineated somewhere‟”. 
Positional objectivity as it is envisaged by Sen distinguishes itself from subjectivity 
whether it is understood as having its source in the mind, or as peculiar to an individual 
subject. Indeed, positional objectivity requires interpersonal invariance of the observation 
when the position of observation is fixed. On the contrary, when the position of observation 
changes (that the observer changes or not), the observation can vary. It is important to specify 
here how Sen defines positional parameters. Beyond the place of observation, it is a question 
of “any general, particularly non-mental, condition that may both influence observation, and 
that can systematically apply to different observers and observations” (p. 158). Sen refers, as 
an example, to the fact of knowing or not a specific language, of being capable or not of 
counting, of having good eyesight or of being colour-blind. What we see is not independent 
from these positional parameters, nor from what we try to see. Bringing to light the positional 
character of observations, faiths and choices is significant both for advancing knowledge and 
for practical reason in order to reach a trans-positional understanding allowing fighting 
against persistent deprivations. 
Interestingly, Sen (pp. 161-167) gets a hold of the Marxian concept of “objective 
illusion”. For Marx, the point was to show that the common belief about the fairness of 
exchange in the labour market was illusory, but objectively accepted by people, even by the 
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exploited workers. As for Sen, he especially uses this concept to analyse gender inequality, by 
showing that women are often the first ones to accept the cultural standard attributing them a 
position of inferiority, participating thus in the perpetuation of gender discriminations. It is an 
“objective illusion” since the belief is positionally objective but erroneous if we examine it in 
a trans-positional way. For example, the knowledge of other societies in which women have 
more opportunities would show that they have as much capacities as men do and would so 
allow overcoming local beliefs and positional prejudices.   
While Sen brings to light the concept of “positional objectivity”, he tries above all to 
underline the crucial role played by position for interpreting systematic and persistent 
illusions which influence the social understanding and the evaluation of public affairs. His 
idea is not to remain cantoned to positional objectivity, but to go beyond it by widening the 
informative base, that is the parameters of position. He recognizes that opened impartiality 
can help significantly in this way, but considers that we can never proceed from positional 
views to a trans-positional view which would be equivalent to a view from nowhere. 
3. The will to reconcile reason and sentiments 
It is right to say that Sen emphasizes the importance of reason and public debate in 
contrast to faith and unreasoned convictions – stressing that the value of reason is not 
quintessentially European or Western. Nevertheless, he does not ignore the role played by 
emotions, psychology or instincts in decision making. Furthermore he considers necessary to 
take them into consideration in our evaluations of justice or injustice, quoting the pragmatist 
philosopher Hilary Putnam for whom „real ethical questions are a species of practical 
question, and practical questions don‟t only involve valuings, they involve a complex mixture 
of philosophical beliefs, religious beliefs, and factual beliefs as well‟ (p. 41)7. Here it can be 
recognized as a recurrent critique addressed by Sen to his peers. In his precedent volume, 
Rationality and Freedom (Sen, 2002, p. 329), he considers indeed that economists and 
political theorists need more social psychology than they are disposed to admit: “social 
influences can induce that a person does not make choices in the way she would like to”. This 
phenomenon he qualifies “choice inhibition” can have a significant impact in social decisions 
built on individual choices. It is particularly “the concrete scope of social choice theory [that] 
is considerably reduced by its tendency to ignore value formation through social interactions 
(Ibid., p. 230).   
To strengthen his view of sentiments, Sen finds a fundamental support in Adam 
Smith‟s writings. However, it is not from his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776) that Sen draws his arguments, but in his major work in moral 
philosophy. Indeed, Sen sees in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1959) a proof that 
sentiments are important, and that it is possible to examine them in order to make evolve local 
prejudices and preconceptions at their source. Smith has shown that instinctive reactions 
toward a specific conduct rely, more often implicitly, on our understanding of what leads to 
this conduct. First perceptions may indeed change “in response to critical examination, for 
                                                 
7 
On this point, Sen brings to mind that objectivity should not be indentified to ethical neutrality, as description 
and evaluation (thus judgment) are often intermingled. This acknowledgment leads to a better clarification of 
value judgments.
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example on the basis of causal empirical investigation that may show, Smith notes, that a 
certain „object is the means of obtaining some other‟” (Sen quoting Smith, p. 50). One can 
recognize here the important thesis of Smith ([1790] 1976, Part I, Section III, Chap. III) 
according to which the great objects of ambition and emulation are to deserve, to acquire, and 
to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind: 
Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so 
much desired object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the 
other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness. […] the one of proud ambition and 
ostentatious avidity, the other of humble modesty and equitable justice. […] the one 
more gaudy and glittering in its colouring; the other more correct and more exquisitely 
beautiful in its outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; 
the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the most studious and careful 
observer. […] The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what 
may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and 
worshippers, of wealth and greatness. 
Smith aimed at revealing the hypocrisy of the « good moral », or simply the absence 
of thinking about our sentiments, highlighting that wealth and greatness, abstracted from 
merit and virtue, almost constantly obtain our respect. « Self-love » takes then the form of 
« self-interest », economic motivation, materialist desires, but not without serious social cost. 
Bringing to light this fool‟s bargain concerning the virtues attributed to fortune was for Smith 
the means to make evolve mentalities, and thereof behaviors. 
In Sen‟s work, there is no particular theory regarding moral sentiments, but a will to 
examine their influence on our reasoning, and conversely to examine the influence – often 
implicit – of our reasoning on them. There is no “sentimentalism” here, but the idea of a 
reasoning that is not synonym of “cold calculation”, which is an indirect critic to decision 
theories that see rationality as a mere maximization of utility. In other words, Sen urges us to 
acknowledge the complex relationship between reason and emotions, particularly in giving an 
important role to the Smithian notion of “sympathy”. In contrast to his common image, Smith 
was not a defender of selfishness, as was Bernard Mandeville at that time. Like Francis 
Hutcheson, he considered sentiment as the principle of moral, but disagreed with his mentor 
on the nature of sentiment, thinking about sympathy rather than benevolence. Far from what 
we now call “methodological individualism” (which tends to see individuals as homo 
oeconomicus), the Smithian subject desperately needs other people to forge his identity, given 
his desire to be approved in the sentiments and passions that motivate his acts. For Smith, 
sympathy is defined by a fellow-feeling between an actor and a spectator with any passion 
whatever. According to this logic, the actor is to approve his behavior only if the spectator 
approves it. However, a real spectator is not necessary as the spectator‟s figure is always in 
the actor‟s mind. By an imaginary split, he watches himself like would do an “impartial 
spectator” – “the man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of [his] conduct” (Ibid., 
Part III, Chap. II). 
For Sen (p. 188), “Sympathy (including antipathy when it is negative) refers to „one 
person‟s welfare being affected by the position of others‟ (for example, a person can feel 
depressed at the sight of misery of others)”. In this way, nothing prevents sympathy to be 
associated to a self-interested behavior as there is no break line between well-being and 
choice. To prove that this view is compatible with Smith‟s one, Sen (p. 185) quotes what he 
wrote more than 250 years ago : „the most humane actions require no self-denial, no self-
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command, no great exertion of the sense of priority‟, and „consist only in doing what this 
exquisite sympathy would of its own accord prompt us to do‟. 
However, we can remark a reversal point of view in Sen‟s writings. For both authors, 
sympathy refers to a concord of sentiments between an actor and a spectator. But, in the one 
hand, Smith seemed to consider that individual well-being increases if other people 
sympathize with him in view of his situation – whether this sympathy concerns a disagreeable 
or agreeable passion. In the other hand, for Sen, individual well-being increases if he 
sympathizes with other people’s (supposed) happiness, in view of their agreeable situation. In 
the one hand, it is to obtain others‟ sympathy and respect that an individual sometimes 
behaves selflessly, without sacrificing self-love. In the other hand, it is because an individual 
sympathizes with other people that he can behave selflessly, without sacrificing his own well-
being. For Smith, the actor wants to obtain the spectator‟s sympathy and therefore adapts 
what he shows; for Sen, the actor is a spectator who changes his acting according to what he 
sees and the way it affects him. In fact Sen above all refers to the shared tendency to 
sympathize with other people, i.e. to take an interest in others‟ joys and grieves; whereas 
Smith referred to a shared tendency to will that other people sympathize with us. Here are two 
starting points quite different that are worth noticing. 
Anyway, Sen‟s definition is not conflicting with Smith‟s conception, as he has written 
([1790] 1976, Part I, Section III, Chap. I): “It is agreeable to sympathize with joy; and 
wherever envy does not oppose it, our heart abandons itself with satisfaction to the highest 
transports of that delightful sentiment. But it is painful to go along with grief, and we always 
enter into it with reluctance”. He simply did not emphasize this aspect.  
Moreover, Sen sees in the “impartial spectator” imagined by Smith the means for each 
one to think about his own sentiments and actions‟ motives, by removing himself from his 
own natural station and endeavouring to view them as at a certain distance from him. Longer 
is the distance, more “the most complete lesson of self-command” (Sen quoting Smith, p. 
125) will be learnt. But longer is the distance, more it is difficult to put oneself in position of 
other people and imagine how they are likely to view our sentiments and motives. Here comes 
the decisive part of discussion and point of view‟s confrontation. In a chapter titled “Closed 
and opened impartiality”, Sen (pp. 108-109) goes even as far as considering that the Smithian 
reasoning requires taking interest in outsiders‟ point of view in order to go beyond the 
constraint of local conventions: “in the approach advanced by Adam Smith, invoking 
„impartial spectators‟, distant voices may be given a very important place for their 
enlightenment relevance, for example to avoid parochialism of local perspectives”. It is not 
sure that Smith would have envisaged the necessary distance in such a radical way, but this 
interpretation is nevertheless plausible in our present globalized world. At least, this is a 
useful argument for Sen to consider global justice, including issues like stopping terrorism 
across borders or thinking about human rights. In his opinion, sympathy can have significant 
scope and power in such debates forcing to think seriously about what can be done, rather 
than proceeding as if societies did not owe anything to each other (pp. 172-173). Here is a 
good starting point for a more comprehensive ethical reasoning – creating above all a moral 
obligation for thinking – but sympathy alone cannot replace practical reasoning.  
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Consequently Sen belongs to a tradition of economists largely described by Emma 
Rothschild, his wife, in Economic Sentiments
8
, including particularly Adam Smith and 
Condorcet. For Rothschild (2002, p. 9), the indefinite idea of a sentiment – as a feeling of 
which one is conscious and on which one reflects – was at the heart of Smith‟s and 
Condorcet‟s political and moral theory. For these authors, sentiments were “events that 
connected the individual to the larger relationships in which he or she lived (the society, or 
the family, or the state)” (Ibid.). While Sen keeps away from David Hume for whom passion 
was probably more powerful than reason, he nonetheless criticizes the authors who based 
their theories exclusively on reason among whom he seems to put Kant and Diderot, 
addressing without doubt indirectly his contemporaries.   
Within the framework of an approach of justice that does not confine to institutions, 
but gives an equally important role to behavioral characteristics and social interactions, it is 
thus necessary to take interest in emotions because these are often at the source of behaviors. 
Sen reminds at the beginning of the book, quoting Charles Dickens (p. vii), “there is nothing 
so finely perceived and finely felt, as injustice”. Instinctive reactions have something to say, 
while it is crucial that they do not have the last word. The importance of emotions can be 
appreciated within the reach of reason, in particular by deliberating on the motives which 
make that we have to take them seriously. 
4. The capability approach as important but not exclusive 
The capability approach represents Sen‟s important theoretical proposition of the last 
decades and he has not stop promoting and refining it. It is thus interesting to examine which 
role he gives it in this work which seems to be a synthesis of his idea of justice after more 
than 50 years of reflection. Let us remind that this approach tries to estimate social situations 
with respect to individual life potentialities, rather than incomes or resources. The idea is to 
estimate what individuals can do or be in society rather than what they have. So important is 
his capability approach to focus evaluations on the freedom of each one to choose the life he 
or she has reasons to value, Sen (pp. 225-252) underlines here that it has some limits for the 
evaluation of justice. 
First, he considers that capability defines only one aspect of freedom and does not 
reveal in an adequate way the “process aspect” of freedom. Indeed, the evaluation of 
capabilities remains an evaluation of results, because capabilities represent the opportunities 
that citizens enjoy – their freedom of life at various levels (having enough to eat, being able to 
participate in the social and economic life or to appear in public without shame, etc.). 
Consequently, it must be completed with an evaluation of the justice of the procedures which 
can be used by the citizens. An adequate theory of justice has to take into account both the 
equity of the processes and the equity of the essential opportunities which the persons can 
enjoy. Sen illustrates this first point by giving the example of the generally better longevity of 
women, in other words their relatively bigger capability to live longer. This statement could 
lead to pay more medical attention on men, but it would violate the requirement of equity in 
the procedures. Sen considers in this respect that priority must be given to the equality of 
                                                 
8
 Unsurprisingly, her book is dedicated “to Amartya”. And Sen do not hesitate to use many ideas developed by 
Emma Rothschild, giving thus a large audience to her contribution as an historian of the economic thought. 
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access to healthcare and not to the equality of opportunity to live long, and thus brings to light 
the tensions which can arise between the process aspect of freedom and capability. 
Secondly, the classification of the social alternatives in terms of capabilities can never 
be complete because of the plurality of aspects and tensions which can exist. For example, 
there can be tension between two aspects of freedom: the freedom of well-being and the 
freedom of action. And Sen (p. 316) insists that “[w]e have to consider both the freedom of 
action and the nature of the consequences and outcomes to have an adequate understanding of 
liberty”. Even if one decides to focus the evaluation on one of these two aspects, he points out 
that it will be difficult to reach an agreement on the weighting of the various capabilities 
identified as important: is it more relevant to evaluate the freedom of action, or the ability to 
read and write or to show itself in public without shame? In some cases, the approach‟s 
inherent incompleteness and ambiguities will not be a problem for distinguishing situations of 
obvious inequality, but sometimes it will be impossible to end in a clear evaluation. For that 
reason, it will sometimes be necessary to introduce other criteria. 
Finally, some rival reasonings can have a role to play for ethical reasons in the 
evaluation of social situations, in particular those which relate to the distributional choices. 
Sen refers in this respect to the discussions about the status of efforts and the rewards that 
should be associated with labour. It can be very relevant for Sen to consider seriously these 
issues, and the underlying one of exploitation, in normative theory and practice. 
Some remarks to conclude 
The book shows that social choice theory can be useful for political and moral 
philosophy. But it cannot produce a theory of justice, or a mere idea of justice. It just allows 
exploring procedures, seeing incompatibility between rules of decision, determining in which 
conditions a decision procedure can lead to a consistent choice – nothing more. Sen‟s 
references to his analysis of famines and gender inequality remind us that empirical analysis 
helped him to develop a new conception of individual advantage and shifting attention 
towards capabilities instead of utility or preferences. Individual preferences still have some 
interest – unsurprisingly given Sen‟s attachment to democracy – but the only preferences to 
count are those which take in consideration the other people and are built with the other 
people, through deliberation. However he refuses the “disengaged tolerance” that has 
dominated normative economics in the twentieth century and has permitted avoiding 
reasoning and discussion about conflictive positions. 
As there is no ideal social choice system, i.e. one social choice theory, for Sen there is 
no perfect theory of justice. We know that he often replaces his capability approach in a very 
large perspective of social choice, and we understand here that his “idea of justice” accounts 
for a theory of justice in a broad sense. Procedures are as always crucial in Sen‟s thought. 
Indeed, what is particularly under scrutiny in this book is the reasoning on which an ethical 
proposition is based and the acceptability of that way of reasoning. It relates closely to the 
issue of objectivity that, for Sen, refers to the ability to stand up to open public reasoning, as it 
will reflect the impartial nature of the proposed positions and the arguments in their support.  
Since Sen acknowledges the central role of public reasoning and debates in the pursuit 
of justice, we guess he identifies his intellectual engagement as a dual task: “using language 
and imagery that communicate efficiently and well through the use of conformist rules, while 
trying to make this language express nonconformist proposals” (p. 122). This is what he learnt 
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from his reading of Gramsci‟s Prison Notebook. Like this political radical whom Sen 
considers as the “most innovative Marxist philosopher of the twentieth century” (p. 119), Sen 
wants to change people‟s thinking and priorities. But he has understood that it requires “an 
engagement with the shared mode of thinking and acting, since for our communication we 
have to be, as Gramsci was quoted earlier as saying, „conformists of some conformism or 
other, always man-in-the-mass or collective man‟” (Ibid.). That way of formulating and 
discussing ideas that are significantly new but nevertheless articulated in terms of old rules of 
expression is quite usual in Sen‟s work, particularly in economics.  
 Lastly, we shall make some comments on filiations or possible correspondence we 
would have liked to see discussed by Sen. While he readily compares his contribution with 
the contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophers‟ writings, we can regret the absence of reference 
to the continental philosophy (phenomenology) rooted in the sensitive experience of men, 
avoiding any reference to an absolute knowledge. Not only, we can find considerable echoes 
of Merleau Ponty‟s perspective (2000), for whom “to the test of events, we acquaint ourselves 
with what is for us unacceptable and it is this interpreted experience which becomes thesis 
and policy”. But Paul Ricœur pays an important tribute to Sen in his book published in 2004, 
Parcours de la reconnaissance, for the conceptual revolution brought by the association 
between individual liberty and collective responsibility, as well as by the will to avoid the 
alternative between consequentialism and deontology
9
. As Sen, phenomenologists highlight 
the original asymmetry between the persons – and the necessity to acknowledge it –, without 
mining the possibility of reaching to reasoned agreements. 
Also, it seems that Sen is rather close to the American institutionalism of the 
beginning of the XXth century to which however he never refers. There is indeed some 
closeness between Sen‟s conception of ethics and the social philosophy of Commons, 
described by Laure Bazzoli (1999) as a « philosophy of the reasonable value ». For instance, 
Commons has defended an ethics of democracy according to which knowledge in social 
sciences must take into account the concerned controversial interests. As Sen, Commons 
(1939, p. 32) has stressed the idea that researchers in social sciences « cannot be disinterested 
as researchers in the sciences of nature. They approve or disapprove, tacitly or openly, [the 
objects] which they study ». This institutionalism is definitely far from « transcendental 
institutionalism » Sen criticizes. 
Finally, references to pragmatist philosophy are also missing in spite of several 
quotations of one of his contemporary supporters. Hilary Putnam has indeed broadly 
commented on Sen‟s work and its possible integration into a pragmatist approach. Sen 
acknowledges the validity of Putman‟s comments on many occasions, but does not really try 
to appear as belonging to the pragmatist tradition. There would be however interesting 
footbridges between his idea of justice and the philosophy developed by Dewey, for whom 
the research of an absolute truth is unjustified because truth must be in essential connection 
with human interests and particular contexts of its research. 
                                                 
9
 Here again, Sen (p. 216) writes: “There is nothing to prevent a general deontological approach from taking 
considerable note of consequences, even if the approach begins with the importance of independently identified 
duties”. 
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In spite of these last remarks, we would recommend that those who want to understand 
the meaning and scope of Sen‟s work, or those who are interested in a rethinking of political 
philosophy, read The Idea of Justice. 
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